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It has become customary in the virtue epistemological literature to distinguish between 
responsibilist and reliabilist virtue theories. More recently, certain problems affecting the 
former have prompted epistemologists to suggest that this distinction in virtue theory 
maps on to a distinction in virtue, specifically between character and faculty virtue. I ar-
gue that we lack good reason to bifurcate virtue in this manner, and that this moreover 
counts in favor of the virtue reliabilist. 
 
 
1. A Distinction in Virtue Theory—and in Virtue? 
It is customary in the virtue epistemological literature to distinguish between two types of virtue 
theory: reliabilist and responsibilist.1 Reliabilist virtue epistemologists understand epistemic vir-
tue in terms of reliable dispositions and take (reliable) perception to be a paradigmatic example of 
such virtue (e.g., Ahlstrom-Vij forthcoming, Greco 2010, Sosa 2007, Goldman 1992, Sosa 1991). 
Responsibilist virtue epistemologists, by contrast, understand epistemic virtue in terms of ac-
quired character traits, and take such virtue to require either reliability in combination with the 
agent being motivated to attain truth or other epistemic goods (Zagzebski 1996), or simply that 
the agent be motivated thus, whether or not she is also reliable (Baehr 2011). The relevant kind of 
motivation is typically characterized as a love of epistemic goods as such (Zagzebski 2003) or 
considered in their own right (Baehr 2011), as opposed to for what they might yield. 
That there is such a distinction in virtue epistemological theory should be uncontroversial. 
More recently, however, it has become popular to suggest that this distinction in theory maps on-
to a distinction in epistemic virtue, between faculty virtues and character virtues. This suggestion 
can be traced back to a problem. While responsibilists hold that instantiating an epistemic virtue 
requires being motivated to attain epistemic goods, there are uncontroversial cases of knowledge 
that involve no motivation, perhaps most saliently cases of perceptual knowledge. Since virtue 
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epistemology is in the business of accounting for epistemic phenomena like knowledge, that’s a 
problem for the responsibilist.2 Recently, responsibilists have sought to respond to this problem 
by suggesting that there are two kinds of virtue, only one of which requires the relevant kind of 
motivation.3 For example, Heather Battaly (2012) suggests that there are ‘different sorts of intel-
lectual virtues, with ties to different sorts of knowledge’ (17). Similarly, Jason Baehr (2011) 
holds that, ‘an intellectual virtue is a character trait that [involves] a positive psychological orien-
tation toward epistemic goods’ (102), while acknowledging that ‘a trait’s being epistemically re-
liable […] is sufficient for its counting as an intellectual virtue in an alternative but also legiti-
mate and pretheoretical sense’ (135). Even virtue reliabilists like John Greco and John Turri 
(2011) now maintain that ‘it is plausible that a complete epistemology must feature both faculty-
virtues and [character] trait-virtues’. 
However, for such a multiplication of virtues to be called for, we need to have independent 
reason to distinguish between different kinds of virtue. The following is not an independent rea-
son: It enables the responsibilist to avoid the aforementioned challenge posed by non-motivated 
knowledge. By contrast, the following would be an independent reason: there are types of 
knowledge that the virtue reliabilist cannot account for, unless she accepts that there are character 
virtues in addition to faculty virtues. Indeed, it is exactly this kind of claim that we will be con-
cerned with in the below: the claim made by Battaly (2012: 17), Baehr (2011: 48) and Zagzebski 
(1996: 273-80) to the effect that, unless we postulate character virtues in addition to faculty vir-
tues, we cannot account for the ‘high-grade’ knowledge possessed in cases of character virtue. 
As the term ‘high-grade’ knowledge suggests, the challenge for the virtue reliabilist is sup-
posed to lie in the (allegedly) superior epistemic value of such knowledge. In what follows, I will 
consider the most promising attempts to cash out this value in terms of the instrumental epistemic 
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 While some virtue epistemologists deny that their virtue theory is seeking to account for traditional epis-
temic phenomena like knowledge (e.g., Roberts and Wood 2007, and Kvanvig 1992), many virtue episte-
mologists—such as Zagzebski (1996), Sosa (2007), Greco (2010), and Baehr (2011)—take themselves to 
be in exactly that business. It is with the latter epistemologists that I am concerned here. Notice that, while 
Baehr (2011) denies that character virtue is unlikely to play a central role in the analysis of knowledge (44-
6), he grants that there is a fully legitimate reliabilist notion of virtue (124). Consequently, his rejection of 
the idea that character virtues are to play a central role in the analysis of knowledge does not amount to a 
rejection of the idea that a virtue epistemology acknowledging a wider set of virtues is to play such a role. 
3
 This is not to suggest that virtue responsibilists haven’t attempted to account for non-motivated 
knowledge in responsibilist terms. See, e.g., Zagzebski (1996: 280), as well as Baehr (2011: 42) for a con-
vincing critique. 
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value (Section 2), intrinsic epistemic value (Section 3), and personal worth (Section 4) associated 
with the motivation had in cases of character virtue. In each case, it will be argued that the rele-
vant value considerations fail to motivate a distinction in virtue. This moreover counts in favor of 
the virtue reliabilist due to the following asymmetry: The virtue reliabilist can account for what 
the virtue responsibilist cannot, such as cases of non-motivated, perceptual knowledge, while the 
arguments to be considered fail to give us any reason to believe that there in turn are types of 
knowledge that can be accounted for by the responsibilist but not by the reliabilist. Since we 
should only postulate kinds—including kinds of virtue—that serve explanatory purposes, that 
counts against the responsibilist and in favor of the virtue reliabilist. 
 
2. Motivation and Instrumental Epistemic Value 
One straightforward way in which the ‘high-grade’ knowledge associated with character virtue 
might be of a higher grade than the supposedly lower-grade knowledge had in cases of faculty 
virtue is in terms of instrumental epistemic value. For example, Zagzebski (2012) has recently 
suggested that ‘intellectual virtues are qualities that arise out of epistemic conscientiousness’ 
(49). Conscientiousness is ‘the self-reflective version of the natural desire for truth’ in that it is ‘a 
natural desire brought to self-reflective consciousness and accompanied by the attempt to satisfy 
it with all of one’s powers’ (48). Moreover, ‘once a person becomes reflective, she thinks that her 
trustworthiness is greater if she summons her powers in a fully conscious and careful way, and 
exercises them to the best of her ability’ (48). That, according to Zagzebski, is what makes con-
scientiousness epistemically relevant: 
 
We trust that there is a connection between trying and succeeding, and the reflective person 
thinks that there is a closer connection between trying with the full reflective use of one’s 
powers, and succeeding. Conscientiousness comes in degrees. There is probably a degree of 
conscientiousness operating most of the time since we have some awareness of ourselves 
and the exercise of our powers most of the time. But higher degrees of conscientiousness re-
quire considerable self-awareness and self-monitoring (Zagzebski 2012: 48-9). 
 
In other words, what we trust, according to Zagzebski, is that trying harder when it comes to 
monitoring ourselves in a self-reflective manner will increase our chances of attaining that which 
we are striving for as epistemic creatures, which includes true belief. It is not hard to see how the 
motivational component of virtue fits into this picture: Being motivated to attain true belief is to 
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want to try harder, for example by becoming more self-reflective, which we in turn trust will in-
crease our reliability. 
The problem is that, since our self-reflective capacities are not only fallible but also subject 
to a number of self-serving biases, being motivated to self-reflect will sometimes increase our 
reliability, and sometimes not.4 Since true belief is intrinsically valuable, the virtue reliabilist can 
account for the value of motivation in cases where it increases our reliability, on account of the 
following thesis regarding the sufficiency of reliability for motivation being valuable: 
 
(MRS)  Motivation is epistemically valuable if it increases your reliability. 
 
The virtue reliabilist can also account for the value of such motivation in case where it fails to 
increase your reliability, for the simple reason that there is no value to account for in such cases. 
Hence, the following thesis regarding the necessity of reliability for motivation being valuable: 
 
(MRN)  Motivation is epistemically valuable only if it increases your reliability.  
 
Consequently, we are not here dealing with a type of knowledge the value of which cannot be 
accounted for unless we postulate character virtues, which is the kind of knowledge the virtue 
responsibilist needs to identify in order to make a case for postulating such virtue in addition to 
faculty virtue. Motivations are sometimes valuable and sometimes not, and the virtue reliabilist 
can account for both types of cases with reference to (MRS) and (MRN). 
It might be objected that it has not been ruled out that motivation might be instrumentally 
valuable in relation to some intrinsic epistemic value separate from that of true belief. However, 
for that possibility to benefit the virtue responsibilist, we would need reason to believe that there 
are bearers of fundamental intrinsic values in addition to true belief, where fundamental intrinsic 
values are ones whose intrinsic value does not derive completely from one of its components. For 
example, if true belief is of fundamental intrinsic epistemic value, all factive mental states (such 
as knowledge) will be of intrinsic value, but not fundamentally so. I have argued elsewhere that 
true belief is unique in being of fundamental intrinsic epistemic value, at least among the most 
plausible candidates of knowledge, justification, and understanding (see Ahlstrom-Vij 2013). 
This, however, leaves open a more direct dialectical route for the virtue responsibilist: maybe mo-
tivation is itself intrinsically valuable. Let us consider that possibility. 
                                                     
4
 See Kornblith (2012) for an extended discussion. 
Forthcoming in Noûs 
 
 5 
 
3. Motivation and Intrinsic Epistemic Value 
While there is no reason for the virtue responsibilist to deny (MRS), she may deny (MRN), i.e., the 
claim that motivation is only epistemically valuable if it increases your reliability. Indeed, focus-
ing on motivations for knowledge rather than truth, Zagzebski (1996) claims that ‘the intrinsic 
and primary value of the motivation for knowledge […] is not derived from its connection with 
any other good, not even the good of knowledge’ (203). If Zagzebski is right, we should reject 
(MRN), and moreover postulate character virtue to account for the additional value manifested by 
those motivated in the relevant manner, as compared to those possessing mere faculty virtue. 
However, in this section, I will argue that Zagzebski is mistaken on this point, and that we lack 
reason to postulate an intrinsic value of motivation. 
To see why, consider Henry Sidgwick’s (1981/1907: 405-6) famous point that happiness is 
more likely to be attained if we don’t consciously pursue it.5 It seems plausible that something 
similar can hold in at least some epistemic cases. Consider the following:  
 
SANDY: Sandy is highly motivated to attain knowledge, and on that account consciously 
working hard to develop strategies for attaining it. But she is a terrible at epistemic strategiz-
ing, to the extent that her efforts simply serve to drive her deeper and deeper into error and 
ignorance. In this respect, Sandy is an epistemic analogue of the tennis player who is far less 
likely to ace her serve when really wanting to ace her serve and thereby consciously trying to 
ace her serve, than when she doesn’t try so hard and simply ‘goes with her gut’. Similarly, 
had Sandy been less motivated, and thereby less prone to strategize about how exactly to at-
tain knowledge, she would (let’s assume) have gone with her gut and thereby also have been 
highly reliable. As things stand, however, she’s highly unreliable, exactly on account of be-
ing highly motivated.  
 
On Zagzebski’s picture, Sandy’s motivation for knowledge remains (intrinsically) valuable de-
spite promoting nothing but error and ignorance. But is it really right to say that motivation is 
valuable thus? Imagine that Sandy finds out that her motivation is highly detrimental to her pur-
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suit of knowledge. If the motivation were intrinsically valuable, that value could reasonably be 
taken to compensate for her lack of success in attaining what she desires, namely knowledge. By 
way of analogy, say I get to choose between a life of happiness and a life of autonomy, but can’t 
have both. If I go for happiness, I can regret not being autonomous while still reasonably saying 
‘I’m fine with living a life lacking in autonomy, since at least I’m happy.’ That is, I can take one 
intrinsic good (happiness) to be compensating for the lack of another (autonomy). But were 
Sandy to respond to information suggesting that her motivation is highly detrimental to her pur-
suit of knowledge by saying ‘I’m fine with that, because the fact that I’m motivated to attain 
knowledge makes up for my lack of success in actually coming to know things’, we would think 
she’s not making sense (or that she’s not sincere in her desire for knowledge—but we’re assum-
ing that she is). The problem for Zagzebski is that, if motivations were intrinsically valuable, 
Sandy’s response should make sense.6 More specifically, we can spell out the following argu-
ment, presenting what we might refer to as a problem of compensation for Zagzebski: 
 
1. Were motivations intrinsically valuable, Sandy’s compensatory response in SANDY 
would make sense. 
2. Sandy’s compensatory response in SANDY doesn’t make sense. 
3. Hence, motivations aren’t intrinsically valuable. 
 
The argument is valid (it’s a modus tollens) and 2 should be uncontroversial. But Zagzebski 
might try to contest 1 along either of four lines: 
First, Zagzebski might contest the very idea of intrinsic values compensating for one another 
in the manner discussed above, and on that account reject 1. More specifically, she might main-
tain that candidates for intrinsic value—be it happiness, autonomy, true belief, or motivation—
only attain intrinsic value once they ‘come together’. In other words, Zagzebski might attempt to 
embrace a thesis about the unity of intrinsic value.7 However, such a response would constitute a 
Pyrrhic victory in this context. If you can only manifest any of the intrinsic values if you have 
them all, Zagzebski would need to reject not only (MRS), but also—and more importantly—the 
very idea that motivations are intrinsically valuable, in the sense she is after. After all, the rele-
vant unity thesis would seem incompatible with the idea that ‘the intrinsic and primary value of 
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7
 Thanks to Anya Farennikova for suggesting this response. 
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the motivation for knowledge […] is not derived from its connection with any other good, not 
even the good of knowledge’ (1996: 203). On the response under consideration, the intrinsic val-
ue of such motivation would be derived from its connection with all other goods. For that reason, 
this does not seem a promising response. 
Second, Zagzebski might argue that the failure of the (putative) value of motivation to com-
pensate for Sandy’s lack of success can be explained with reference to the incommensurability of 
the relevant values. But that cannot be it either. One value can compensate for another despite the 
two being incommensurable. For example, we can think that the values of happiness and autono-
my are incommensurable—i.e., neither is greater than the other, nor are they equal—while still 
taking one to compensate for the other, as in the example above. Or consider Joseph Raz’s (1986) 
example of someone facing a choice between a successful career as a lawyer and an equally suc-
cessful career as a clarinetist. While the values involved are reasonably taken to be incommen-
surable, it would still seem to make perfect sense for the person in question to reflect on their 
choice afterwards and say ‘I’m fine with missing out on all of the good things that other career 
would’ve brought, because of all of the good things that my current career is giving me’. Since 
such a response makes sense even in cases of incommensurable values, any appeal to incommen-
surability fails to explain why Sandy’s response above doesn’t make sense. 
Third, Zagzebski might suggest that Sandy’s motivation for knowledge cannot compensate 
for an absence of knowledge, not because the former isn’t intrinsically valuable, but because it’s 
not as valuable as knowledge.8 However, if that were the case, we should expect for it to be pos-
sible to increase the motivation to a point where it does compensate for an absence of knowledge. 
So consider the following: 
 
MANDY: Mandy is just like Sandy, except that Mandy is extremely motivated, and that she 
moreover is motivated to attain knowledge about a great many highly significant matters. 
Indeed, let us assume that she is the kind of inquirer that, were she to succeed in her epistem-
ic pursuits, she would be a strong candidate for a Nobel Prize. But, just like in the case of 
Sandy, Mandy’s motivation simply serves to drive her deeper and deeper into error and igno-
rance.  
 
If the problem with SANDY were simply that Sandy’s motivation wasn’t as intrinsically valuable 
as the knowledge she failed to attain, it would make sense for Mandy to say, upon finding out the 
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extent of her failure, that ‘I’m fine with failing to attain knowledge, because the fact that I’m ex-
tremely motivated to attain knowledge about a great many highly significant matters makes up for 
my lack of success in actually coming to know things’. But just like in SANDY, that doesn’t 
make sense. 
Fourth, Zagzebski might argue that Sandy’s response doesn’t make sense on purely psycho-
logical grounds that tell us nothing interesting about value. She wants knowledge, but has no de-
sire (let’s assume) to want knowledge. But notice that it’s not just that such compensation doesn’t 
make sense from Sandy’s first-person point of view; it doesn’t make sense from a third-person 
point of view either. To see why, consider the following: 
 
CHOICE: We are able to realize either of two situations for Sandy. The first one is the one in 
SANDY: she’s motivated to attain knowledge, but failing miserably. In the second situation, 
she attains knowledge but lacks the relevant motivation. What should we do?  
 
If both knowledge and a motivation to attain knowledge were intrinsically valuable, we could go 
for either—in either case, we’re realizing some intrinsic value that thereby compensates for the 
absence of the other. But it seems clear that we should realize the second situation. That means 
that we can not go for either, and (by modus tollens) that a motivation to attain knowledge is not 
intrinsically valuable. 
It might be objected that this line of reasoning ignores the following consideration:  
 
CHOICE*: We are able to realize either of two situations for Sandy. In the first one, Sandy 
knows but isn’t motivated to pursue knowledge. In the second one, she knows (as much and 
the same things) and is motivated to pursue knowledge. What should we do? 
 
Zagzebski might argue that we should pick the latter option, and that we can only account for that 
if we reject (MRN) and take the relevant kind of motivation to be intrinsically valuable. There’s 
some intuitive pull to this suggestion. Still, it’s not clear that we should take the relevant intuition 
at face value. To see why, consider a slightly different option set:  
 
CHOICE**: We are able to realize either of two situations for Sandy. In the first one, Sandy 
knows absolutely everything there’s to know. In the second one, Sandy knows absolutely 
everything there’s to know and is also motivated to pursue knowledge. What should we do? 
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If the relevant kind of motivations were intrinsically valuable, then we should go for the latter 
option. But it does not seem that we should go for the latter option; we may go for either—which 
makes complete sense, if motivations are not intrinsically valuable, and there as such is no differ-
ence in value between the options. Consequently (by modus tollens), the relevant kind of motiva-
tions aren’t intrinsically valuable. 
It might be objected that this simply pits one intuition against another, and rejects the one 
that’s theoretically inconvenient. However, that ignores the general meta-ontological thesis that 
we should prefer ontologies with fewer rather than more existential commitments, ceteris pari-
bus.9 In axiology, this amounts to a principle of axiological parsimony, according to which we 
should postulate as few fundamental values as possible. This principle does not rule out pluralist 
axiologies by fiat; it simply entails that pluralism is only warranted if required to account for rel-
evant data. It also gives us reason to break intuitive stalemates—i.e., situations wherein one theo-
ry explains one intuition, and another theory explains another—in favor of the simpler theory, in 
the sense of the theory which postulates fewer fundamental values. In this case, that’s the theory 
that doesn’t postulate a fundamental intrinsic value of motivation, in addition to that of true be-
lief. (Knowledge is intrinsically valuable in virtue of its factivity, and as such not of fundamental 
intrinsic value.) 
Consequently, the problem of compensation remains for Zagzebski: Were motivations in-
trinsically valuable, Sandy’s compensatory response would make sense; Sandy’s compensatory 
response does not make sense; hence, motivations aren’t intrinsically valuable. Of course, if we 
drop the idea that motivations are intrinsically valuable, we can explain why her response doesn’t 
make sense: Since (MRN) is true and Sandy’s motivation fails to increase her reliability—in fact, 
it’s doing the opposite—Sandy’s motivation lacks value, and something that lacks value cannot 
compensate for the absence of another value. That is why Sandy’s motivation doesn’t compensate 
for her failure in the relevant case. Moreover, if motivations of the kind that Zagzebski is con-
cerned with lack intrinsic value, they fail to make plausible the idea that there is a kind of ‘high-
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grade’ knowledge, the value of which we cannot explain unless we postulate character virtues in 
addition to faculty virtues.10 
 
4. Motivation and Personal Worth 
In the previous section, it was argued that what Zagzebski has to say about the intrinsic value of 
motivations fails to give us any reason to postulate character virtues in addition to faculty virtues, 
on account of what we referred to as the problem of compensation. In this section, we will con-
sider whether a case for postulating such virtue can be made with reference to Baehr’s (2011) 
suggestion that character virtues ‘plausibly bear on their possessor’s “personal worth,” that is, on 
their possessor’s goodness or badness qua person’ (23).  
Like Zagzebski, Baehr locates the relevant worth in the motivations of the agent. He defines 
‘an intellectual virtue [as] a character trait that contributes to its possessor’s personal intellectual 
worth on account of its involving a positive psychological orientation toward epistemic goods’ 
(102). While Baehr doesn’t deny that motivations for knowledge can be instrumentally valua-
ble—i.e., he doesn’t deny (MRS)—he denies (MRN) on account of taking the relevant kind of mo-
tivations to be intrinsically valuable (137). Unlike Zagzebski (1996), however, who believes that 
the value of motivation ‘is not derived from its connection with any other good, not even the good 
of knowledge’ (203), Baehr (2011) thinks that the value of motivation does depend on the good 
of knowledge, albeit not instrumentally. More specifically, he thinks that ‘it is apparently good in 
itself to love what is good in itself’ (137), and that a motivation for knowledge thereby is valuable 
on account of an intentional and not merely a causal (and as such strictly instrumental) relation to 
something good, namely knowledge. 
If Baehr is right, we might thereby need to postulate character virtue in addition to faculty 
virtue in order to account for the personal worth attaching to ‘high-grade’ knowers possessing the 
relevant kind of motivation, and thereby standing in the relevant intentional relation to 
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 It might be objected that we need to appeal to the value of motivation—and potentially to the intrinsic 
value of motivation—to solve the so-called value problem, i.e., the problem of accounting for the surplus 
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knowledge. However, Baehr’s account of virtue fails for much the same reason that Zagzebski’s 
does, namely on account of the problem of compensation. Irrespective of whether the value of a 
motivation for knowledge is intrinsic in Zagzebski’s or in Baehr’s sense, we should expect for it 
to make sense for Sandy, in SANDY, to say ‘I’m fine with failing to attain knowledge, because 
the fact that I truly love knowledge makes up for my lack of success in actually coming to know 
things’. That response doesn’t make sense, and as we saw in the previous section, it’s not clear 
that someone taking the relevant kind of motivation to be intrinsically valuable can account for 
that fact. 
However, it might be objected that Baehr, unlike Zagzebski, has a way to rule out SANDY. 
Addressing cases of motivated but unreliable agents, Baehr (2007) proposes that you are only 
virtuous if you have good reason to believe that the actions you perform in pursuit of your epis-
temic goals are in fact reliable means to those goals. This constraint prevents some unreliable but 
motivated agents from qualifying as virtuous (e.g., motivated fortunetellers pursuing knowledge 
through crystal balls). Moreover, having found out about her failure, Sandy arguably lacks the 
relevant kind of reason, and as such also lacks virtue. But virtues and the motivations that charac-
terize them are two separate things—if not, we wouldn’t be able to explain the value of the for-
mer with reference to the latter, in the manner that Baehr wants to do. And since two separate 
phenomena, lacking good reason to think oneself reliable doesn’t prevent one from being moti-
vated in the relevant way, and thereby instantiating the relevant personal worth (while failing to 
be virtuous). Consequently, the problem remains: were Sandy to find out that her motivation for 
knowledge is, in fact, driving her deeper and deeper into ignorance and error, yet respond by sug-
gesting that her motivation compensates for her failure, we wouldn’t think that her response 
makes sense—despite the fact that such a response would make complete sense, were motivations 
intrinsically valuable. And, as argued in Section 3, the most plausible explanation for why such a 
response wouldn’t make sense is that (MRN) is true, and motivations only are valuable in so far as 
they make us more reliable—which, as we saw in Section 2, the virtue reliabilist will have no 
problem accounting for. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Cases of non-motivated perceptual knowledge go to show that there are epistemic phenomena we 
cannot account for unless we postulate faculty virtues. Virtue responsibilists grant this, but claim 
that we also need to postulate character virtues. This would be true, were there in turn types of 
knowledge we couldn’t account for unless we also postulated character virtue. The previous sec-
tions considered the three most plausible ways to cash out this idea, with reference to the instru-
Forthcoming in Noûs 
 
 12 
mental epistemic value (Section 2), intrinsic epistemic value (Section 3), and personal worth 
(Section 4) associated with the kind of motivation for truth or knowledge supposedly had in cases 
of ‘high-grade’ knowers possessing character virtue. In each case, however, it was shown that the 
relevant phenomena can be accounted for with reference to a combination of (MRS) and (MRN), 
i.e., the claim that motivation is valuable if and only if it increases your reliability. That claim is, 
of course, completely congenial to the virtue reliabilist.  
This is not to say that there cannot be further phenomena, in addition to those considered 
above, that can only be accounted for if we postulate character virtue.11 But until such a phenom-
enon is identified, we need to keep in mind the asymmetry highlighted in Section 1: The virtue 
reliabilist can account for what the virtue responsibilist cannot, such as cases of non-motivated 
perceptual knowledge, while the arguments considered above fail to give us any reason to believe 
that there in turn are phenomena that can be accounted for by the responsibilist but not the relia-
bilist. That counts against the responsibilist and suggests that we can make do with the kind of 
virtue postulated by the reliabilist. That’s why we should resist the bifurcation of virtue that has 
become popular in recent virtue epistemology.12 
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